Article explores the natural gas resources of Central Eurasia and the political and economic issues raised by their general inaccessibility. Central to these issues are the international pipelines required to bring this increasingly important energy source to meet growing world demand, and their intimate connection to the security of all the nations involved. They are complicated by the growing, yet still largely potential, competition from a world LNG market driven by new technologies, and hence natural gas sources, outside of central Eurasia. Each of the major actors in this area, from the producer states and their national energy companies to the wealthy consuming states with an increasing demand for natural gas are pursuing, frequently con ‡icting, strategies to insure their energy and income security and their development prospects. This paper focusses in particular on the strategies of Russia/Gazprom, the Central Asian producers and the transit states, and on the pipelines, both actual and potential, that intertwine them.
1 The ' Problem'with Natural Gas
In a world increasingly concerned about the environmental impact of the use of the energy required to maintain modern standards of living, natural gas holds a special place as a carrier of energy. Although a hydro-carbon based source, natural gas is the 'cleanest'in exploitation, 1 and is far more readily usable/mobile and available than any 'cleaner'fuels. It is also usable without the other, non-GHG, environmental impacts of nuclear, hydro, wind, solar, or battery metals use. 2 The European Commission's (2012) "Energy Roadmap 2050"asserts that natural gas must play the critical role in the transition to a 'decarbonized'basis, indicating a large and growing, if highly uncertain gas demand by the EU. Similarly, it must play a critical and growing role in the developing world's 'catching up' to the living standards of OECD, even as the latter move to constrain material consumption in the pursuit of "sustainability." Thus there is a growing demand, indeed need, for readily available natural gas.
Further, accessible world reserves of natural gas are growing rapidly in response to growing demand and the development of new extraction technologies, promising potentially abundant supplies in the near future. There is however a problem connecting this supply to the burgeoning demand. It arises from both geography and the technical characteristics of natural gas as an energy source. First, as consumption grows, new sources of natural gas supply become increasingly remote and inaccessible, and hence increasingly costly to access. Further, with few exceptions, the primary net consumers of natural gas are located far from the sources of abundant net supply, requiring long distance transportation of that basic energy source. That is 1 Natural gas generates 50% less carbon per unit energy than other hydrocarbons. IEA Energy Report (2010). 2 All energy sources have environmental side e¤ects, and most are less reliable and less tranportable/ ‡exible than hydrocarbon based energy. See, for a brief discussion, Sweet (2011) , p. 101 -2. where technical characteristics of natural gas as an energy carrier come in, imposing substantial costs and geopolitical complications on the process of connecting suppliers and users. Gas has low energy content per unit volume, even when substantially compressed, compared to oil and coal. For its energy to be commercially usable outside its production locality, it must be compressed and transported under high pressure, or lique…ed and transported under refrigeration. The former involves building high pressure pipelines over vast distances, with supporting pumping and storage stations, requiring substantial initial infrastructure investment. The latter involves substantial lique…cation facilities at the end of supply pipelines and expensive gasi…cation facilities to become usable through a distribution pipeline network, as well as a means of transporting the LNG between those facilities. It is generally only cost e¢ cient by sea, over long distances, in specialized LNG tankers.
Thus, to date, the primary form of supply of Eurasian natural gas is by long distance, high pressure pipeline, and largely to its well-healed European periphery. The initial, and still most substantial, pipelines supplying Europe were geopolitically uncomplicated. The Soviet Union controlled all sources of supply and the full transportation routes to the border of the European Common Market, and both Europe and the Soviet Union saw the mutual advantages of stable and relatively cheap energy for Europe, and long-term stable income therefrom for the Soviet Union (Stern, 2005) . The substantial …xed costs of installing the pipelines were substantially …nanced by Europe, which also supplied much of the high quality pipe and equipment required for the system. These costs were paid for, largely in natural gas deliveries, under long term contracts at a negotiated price. As the price of oil stabilized, following the OPEC oil embargo crises of the 1970s, the price of oil became a mutually acceptable benchmark, generating the so called "net back price" based on the price of oil and the energy content of natural gas delivered to the European border, making oil products and natural gas 'equivalent cost'in use. 3 With the collapse and break-up of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical situation became vastly more complicated. First, while Russia remained the largest single producer and natural gas reserves holder, a substantial amount of natural gas (as well as oil) production and reserves passed to the control of the newly independent states of central Asia and the Caucasus. Further, the uni…ed natural gas and oil pipeline systems were broken up, and each new state of the former Soviet Union gained control over those pipes on its territory, as did the former CMEA members through whose territory the Soviet controlled system passed. This gave those (FSU and CMEA) states to the west of Russia control over export pipelines to Europe, making them "transit states" for the export of both oil and gas from the former Soviet Union. However, Russia retained almost total control over the ability of central Asian states to export to the West, as all their export pipelines passed through Russia before entering the transit states.
This situation and the inherent characteristics of pipelines create a number of economic and political problems that we explore below. First, due to their structure, tying a source to a use destination, high initial …xed costs, and the inherent uncertainties in supply costs and demand, pipeline projects impose substantial risks on all involved while locking both the supplier and user in a relationship that is extraordinarily costly to break. This creates a mutual dependence, a need for risk sharing, and asymmetric leverage -"holdup" possibilities -that can be used either for cooperative development or geopolitical advantage. This is particularly the case with respect to Eurasian natural gas where there are as yet no substantial alternatives to pipelines for supply, no developed market for alternative supply, and limited substitutability in use in an increasingly "green"world. Eurasian natural gas has been, and will remain for the foreseeable future, central to meeting world natural gas needs, and critical to European and East Asian supply. It is abundant and centrally located with respect to the 'Eurasian ring'of high and rapidly growing demand -Europe, South Asia, and East Asia. While MENA and North American LNG supply capabilities are rapidly growing, they remain a relatively distant and expensive source of gas energy for this ring of demand, presenting Eurasian producers with a growing opportunity. But exploiting that opportunity requires overcoming the geopolitical and economic issues with natural gas we have indicated here and explore below.
Supply and Demand

Eurasian Reserves and Supply of Natural gas
OECD's International Energy Agency (2011) has called the next several decades a potential "golden age of gas," due to the rapidly growing availability of natural gas and its relatively limited ecological impact from its low carbon footprint relative to other hydrocarbon energy sources. In the last decade, partly in response to high energy prices, the global 'proved' reserves of natural gas have grown by 24% (BP, 2012), without fully accounting for exploitable shale reserves.
Estimated Natural Gas Reserves
The leading holders of proven natural gas reserves in the world, excluding recently added Turkmen and US reserves, and expected arctic reserves, are shown in almost the same as Qatar and about three times proved US reserves (excluding new shale gas). 4 When shale gas is accounted for, however, US reserves grow almost 8-fold. U.S. natural gas reserves, including shale gas, were estimated in 2011 to be 2074 tcf (58.7 tcm), a 90 year supply at current rates, hence larger than even Russian reserves (50 tcm or 1770 tcf), while in 2008, they were estimated at only 245 tcf (6.94 tcm).
The exploration of Arctic reserves is expected to provide a major part of future reserves growth, although both technical and political issues that remain to be resolved before they are exploitable. 5 A current USGS estimate of those reserves is contained in Fig. 2 Stranded Natural Gas: Proven reserves are de…ned as "those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reserves under existing economic and operating conditions." One type of such currently unexploited reserves is what is called "stranded gas," gas that is produced, or readily producible, as by product of existing oil and gas …elds, but not commercialized for economic reasons. Central Eurasia holds a particularly signi…cant amount of such gas. 6 A recent study (Attanasi, Freeman, 2012) has explored the conditions for economic viability of its exploitation, noting that this gas is 'stranded'primarily due to a lack of outlet to higher priced world markets. They derive 'supply prices'at the FSU border at which this stranded gas becomes commercially viable, that is delivery prices at which all extraction and transportation costs, and a 'normal pro…t', are covered. The volumes of such Eurasian natural gas, the price at which each country's stranded reserves begin to become commercially viable, and the volume that is viable at $10 per thousand cubic feet on Russian-European border, are indicated in Table 1 . These are substantial, readily mobilizable reserves, once political and contractual issues are resolved. 
Annual Supply
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These reserves provide the foundation for the volumes of natural gas produced annually and supplied internationally. Eurasia, and in particular Russia, makes a substantial contribution to world production and net supply of natural gas. In 2011, world production was 3,276.2 bcm [ 2,921 million tons oil equivalent], with MENA (esp. Qatar, Iran, Libya) supplying 20.4%, including 9.1% from Qatar and Iran, and 3% from Saudi Arabia. North America provided 26.5%, including 20% from the US (651.3 bcm or 23 tcf) and 4.9% from Canada, and Europe produced 7.7%, about 260 bcm. The FSU produced 23.6% (776.1 bcm or 27.4 tcf) 8 The statistics in this section are taken from BP (2012) and IEA (2011b). including 18.5% (607 bcm) from Russia, 1.8% from Turkmenistan, and 1.7% from Uzbekistan.
Most world production, however, is for 'own'consumption. The US consumes more than it's own production, exporting only 2 bcm LNG in 2011. Similarly, Europe only exported 5.3 bcm in 2011, although individual countries, in particular Netherlands and Norway, exported substantial amounts (50.4 and 92.8 bcm, respectively) to other European countries. The major suppliers of international natural gas exports are in Eurasia, MENA, and Asia/Paci…c (in particular Myanmar and Indonesia), each providing a substantial share of their production to the world 'market'. Russia exported, by pipeline, 207 bcm to both Europe (140.6 bcm, including Turkey) and the other FSU states (66.4 bcm), while importing 30.1 bcm of pipeline gas from other FSU states, and exported 14.4 bcm of LNG to the Asia/Paci…c region, 13.9 bcm of it to Northeast Asia (Japan, S. Korea, China). Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and other Central Asian states export through pipelines to Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and each other, with the most substantial exports being to Russia (30 bcm), China (14.3 bcm), and Iran (10.6 bcm). 9 These Eurasian states had no LNG capacity in 2011. Yet they and Russia hold truly vast reserves, far beyond any domestic consumption possibilities, making them potential drivers in the development of natural gas as a primary world energy source.
Projected Demand for Eurasian Natural Gas
Natural gas provides 20.9% of primary energy used, which is expected to grow to 22.4% by 3035 (IEA, 2011b). The BP Energy Outlook 2030 has it growing to 27% by 2030, almost matching the shares of oil and coal, while Gazprom, the worlds largest natural gas trader, projects world demand for natural gas to grow to 26% of energy consumption (Gazprom, 2012) . In 2010 world consumption was 3.2 tcm, and is forecast to grow to 5.1 tcm in 2030. This growth will be driven by both economic and ecological considerations. In particular, the cost of natural gas per BTU is currently, and is expected to remain, substantially lower than that of oil, with a substantially smaller 'carbon footprint'. 10 Thus natural gas will increasingly replace oil not only in electric power generation and heating, but also in land and sea transportation as new supporting distribution infrastructure develops. This growth in demand will be particularly strong in the Asia/Paci…c region and in the developing world. But two regions stand out as consuming far more than they will produce:
Europe and Asia/Oceania, while the FSU, Middle East, and Africa, despite substantial growth in demand, will remain net suppliers to the world. Indeed, Russia and central Asia will need to supply about half of the growing import needs (excess demand) of Europe and Asia/Oceania for natural gas.
Currently, the EU imports some 42% of its compressed (non-LNG) natural gas from/ (Gazprom, 2012) . Both Eurasia and MENA are well placed to meet this demand, with Russia dominating the existing infrastructure for meeting it.
11 9 In 2011, Azerbaijan supplied Turkey (3.8 bcm) and Iran (0.4 bcm), and Turkmenistan supplied NG to China (14.3 bcm) and Iran (10.2 bcm).
1 0 In 2010 to 2012, the cost of natural gas/BTU ‡uctuated between one-third and one-…fth the cost of oil according to Bloomberg (Gazprom, 2012) . It provides the same energy with 53% of the CO 2 emissions of coal and 70% of oil CO 2 emissions (McKinsey for the European Gas Advocacy Forum, 2011). 1 1 Currently, the political situaton in the middle east, in particular the Iranian nuclear and Arab-Israeli confrontations, poses a substantial obstacle to expansion of middle east gas supply to Europe. The expansion of non-Russian Eurasian natural gas The Asia/Paci…c region is the other major source of net demand for natural gas. The IEA (2012) expects non-OECD Asian natural gas/LNG demand to grow by 3.6% per year to 2030, with both Chinese and Indian demand growing substantially faster (5.8% and 4.8% per year, respectively). Gazprom (2012) anticipates an annual import demand of over 600 bcm in the region in 2030, implying an import growth rate of over 4.7%.
This again is demand which Eurasia, given appropriate infrastructure (both pipeline and LNG facilities) development, is well placed to meet. In 2011, about 250 bcm were imported by Asia/Paci…c countries, about 83% as LNG, with Japan and South Korea the major consumers (107 and 49.3 bcm LNG respectively), and Taiwan, China, and India each importing 16 to 17 bcm LNG. Currently Russia provides 6.9% of Asia/Paci…c LNG, and no pipeline gas; only Turkmenistan is supplying pipeline gas to the region, and only to China (14.3 bcm). Eurasia thus stands in a central position relative to the areas of greatest excess demand for natural gas.
However, its reserves remain far from the end points of consumption, without ready sea access and often blocked by rough terrain and political barriers. In addition, as natural gas is an extremely bulky energy carrier, 13 the costs of transportation loom much larger than for other energy sources, particularly over long distances. Finally, those barriers and costs are increasing with the expansion of known reserves, as those reserves (with the exception of some new North American shale gas) are increasingly located in ever more distant and less hospitable terrain.
Economics of Pipelines: Risk Sharing in Natural Gas (Large-Scale Investment) Projects
The delivery of natural gas from its source to end use distributors requires substantial infrastructure at very high cost. Pipelines for compressed natural gas (CNG) cost over $1 million/km, and recent estimates for new pipelines connecting Eurasian natural gas to markets give expected costs of $5-15 billion. LNG infrastructure is even more expensive in terms of initial …xed costs, which run about $1000/mmt/year capacity for lique…cation facilities, and about $1 bil/bcf gasi…cation capacity. 14 In addition, supplying LNG to the market requires specialized transportation vessels costing about $0.25 bil each. However, sea transport, when possible, renders LNG shipment more cost e¤ective than pipelines when distances are over 4000 km (Masudo, 2009) . With the exception of the Russian north and far east (Sakhalin) 'o¤shore'…elds, Eurasia doesn't have this LNG option, and must rely on long distance, compressed gas pipelines for delivery of its natural gas energy. But in either case, vast investments must be made up front, requiring substantial borrowing and/or commitment of own resources, with revenues only beginning to be received years later, for Eurasian (or any other) natural gas supplies to reach end users. This raises a critical question: when the project is completed, with its inevitable delays and cost over-runs, will there be su¢ cient e¤ective demand to justify those vast initial expenditures?
Energy prices are volatile, and becoming increasingly so, and futures markets for natural gas are extraordinarily 'thin', unlike those for oil. 15 Furthermore, actual future physical demand for any speci…c natural gas supply to Europe is limited by the lack of infrastructure (non-Russian pipelines), as is FSU natural gas supply to Asia. 1 2 All the 2011 …gures come from BP (2012). 1 3 1 million BTU of natural gas is contained in 1000 cubic feet, which is less than 1/6 th the energy of a single barrel of oil. Although the energy density of LNG is 2.4 times that of natural gas, it is still only about 60% that of oil. 1 source is uncertain (high volatility), creating the serious risk that, after vast expenditures have been made to create the infrastructure, insu¢ cient revenue will be generated to justify the provision of natural gas, particularly if competing energy sources arise. Thus success in the supply of natural gas over long distances requires long-term up-front commitment on both sides of a long-term transaction.
The high and uncertain initial costs, and the uncertainties about future demand, make any natural gas development/export project extremely risky. With compressed natural gas, this riskiness is aggravated by the tie-in e¤ect of a pipeline. A pipeline has the economic structure of a natural monopoly: very high …xed costs, but very low marginal costs, up to pipeline capacity. Thus, once the pipeline is in place, the provision of natural gas, up to built capacity, is far less costly than any other energy source. But unless vast expenditures are made up-front, that cheap energy source will not be available. On the other hand, due to the vast set-up costs and di¢ culties of transporting commercially usable quantities of natural gas, there will be no alternatives for users who have …tted their equipment for (relatively) cheap natural gas, without incurring high costs of re…tting equipment for alternative energy carriers (e.g. oil, coal).
Thus both suppliers and consumers of natural gas face substantial risks, although the bene…ts to both from a successful relationship can be quite large. A supplier faces demand/income risk ; after substantial expenditure, he may not be able to earn enough to recoup (capitalized) expenditures on the project, or even to repay the borrowing it required. A consumer faces energy supply/hold-up risk; once she is connected to the pipeline, with lock-in to the single source for substantial, needed energy, and very high 'switching costs' if that supply is disrupted. Hence, to realize a project and its potential bene…ts, some form of 'risk sharing', insuring against unanticipated changes in supply, demand, or prices, is typically required. A supplier seeks a long-term (25+ years) contract, with some stable pricing formula, and a "take or pay" clause, to guarantee su¢ cient revenue to justify the project, thereby insuring against income/demand risk. Similarly, a buyer seeks a long-term contract with a stable pricing formula allowing market driven renegotiation, and/or equity in the resource extraction and transportation ventures, giving her some control over the supply and pricing decisions, thereby insuring against the risk of cuto¤ of needed natural gas supply.
Natural gas pipeline supply faces a further geographic complication: pipelines pass through national territory. Hence, unlike with LNG, there are transit operators who must be paid, but who also have hold-up power and face 'income risk'from changes in the ‡ow of natural gas from supplier to end user. This generates transit risk that can also be managed through ownership (participation) and/or long-term contracting.
Indeed, the "natural monopoly" nature of long-distance pipelines, and the lack of single sovereign control over the pipelines, generates uncertainty that must be 'managed'over the long term for the bene…ts of the pipeline project to be realized.
An expensive 'solution'to all these potential hold-up problems lies in "diversi…cation,"a 'risk mitigation' rather than 'risk sharing'strategy. It involves developing redundant alternatives to each of the pieces of the problem: sources of supply, routes of supply, and other outlets for the product. This is expensive, indeed directly wasteful if there were no hold-up problem on any side, as the natural monopoly nature of pipelines implies that the lowest cost, most e¢ cient way to meet needs and generate income for suppliers is a single route/pipeline (system). But it also provides 'insurance', a (second best) alternative, should anything go wrong in the chain of supply/payment.
Existing Pipelines and ' Netback'Pricing
Currently almost all Eurasian natural gas is supplied through long-term contracts at pre-determined netback prices. Those contracts are individually negotiated between supplier and user, leading to sometimes sub-stantial di¤erences among delivery prices to di¤erent users, and include regular renegotiation provisions to accommodate changes in the oil product prices on which the netback is based. 16 In almost every case, Russia/Gazprom is the supplier and a European country/energy company is the buyer, and supply to Europe's eastern borders is through the massive pipeline system built by the Soviet Union, with European help, beginning in the 1970's (Stern, 2005) . The existing system, with its (Russian and NABUCCO) planned extensions, is displayed in Fig. 4 below, where thickness indicates the capacity of the route. Ukraine. In general, the netback price to non-FSU Europe ranges from $9 to $12/1000 ft 3 , while the Russian purchase price from central Asian FSU is about $7/1000 ft 3 and the Russian domestic price remains frozen at about $2.40 to industry and $2.10 to government entities (housing and utility providers, administration, etc.). Some international benchmark (spotmarket) prices for both natural gas and oil are also provided. 18 Recent developments in pricing are also part of the strategic interaction discussed below.
Newly Developed (Chinese) Pipelines
Until the last few years, this Soviet-derived network has been the only pipeline outlet for Eurasian natural gas, with the exception of a few limited capacity pipelines to Iran and Turkey for their local use. That has changed dramatically since 2009, as China, in pursuit of energy to support its rapid economic growth, has brought massive investments in energy infrastructure, both domestic and foreign, to fruition. The Chinese challenge to Russian hegemony in delivery of Eurasian natural gas is a boon to the central Asian producers. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already negotiated access to the new Chinese-driven pipeline, which can facilitate development of exports from their reserves and stranded gas. 20 China is also in discussions with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for development of a more eastern route for Turkmen gas to reach China, enhancing the security of Chinese supply and increasing Chinese leverage in these states.
China has also shown some interest in the Turkmen and Afghan portions of the TAPI proposed pipeline(s), strengthening cooperation with Turkmenistan and laying the groundwork for greater in ‡uence in post-war Afghanistan. 21 
Competing Supplies
Russia and the other Eurasian natural gas producers all face a growing challenge from other suppliers, particularly in supplying Europe but also as they attempt to move into new, rich markets in Asia. 1 9 V. Socor, "China to Increase Central Asian Gas Imports through Multiple Pipelines," EDM 9(152), 9 August 2012. 2 0 V. Socor, "Kazakhstan Expands Gas Transit Pipeline Capacities and Own Exports to China," EDM, 9(153), 10 August 2012.
2 1 V. Socor, "China to Increase Central Asian Gas Imports through Multiple Pipelines," EDM 9(152), 9 August 2012.
MENA Pipelines and Problems
As seen above ( Fig. 1) , half of the top 10 holders of natural gas reserves are MENA (Middle East -North Africa) states, which supply, beyond own consumption, about 19% ( Fig. 8 ) of world natural gas (55 bcf or 1.6 bcm/year). They would be expected to provide greater net supply and hence major competition
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to Eurasian suppliers, as they do with oil, but for the technical issues of transporting natural gas energy discussed above. Thus, while Algeria and Libya provide trans-Mediterranean pipeline CNG to Europe, the other MENA suppliers must largely provide LNG to the world market; they currently lack large scale international pipelines to the major users. 22 Iran's relations with the West, and the U.S. in particular, pose a major obstacle to further developing the existing limited pipelines for supplying natural gas to Europe, or indeed to South Asia. 23 This presents an opportunity, albeit undoubtedly not long-lasting, for Eurasian natural gas suppliers/producers to strengthen their position in major consumer markets around the Eurasian fringe, and build pipeline systems that would allow them to remain competitive once the Middle East is able to fully compete. It, however, also obstructs the shortest route, across Iran, for Turkmen natural gas to reach world markets, either through pipelines in Turkey or by sea as LNG.
LNG: An Emerging market?
Where MENA is apt to have a more immediate impact, barring further major upheaval/war in the region, is through the emerging LNG market. Iran and Qatar currently hold the second and third largest proven and exploited reserves of natural gas with ready access to the sea and rapidly developing LNG capabilities. They are primary suppliers to the Asia/Paci…c region, supplying almost 75 bcm LNG of the 207 imported in 2011, including most Indian imports, and almost half of Chinese, Japanese and Korean imports. 24 With its active implementation of new hydraulic fracturing technologies, the U.S. may overtake them through accessing shale natural gas, as indicated in the discussion of gas reserves above (Gerard, 2012) . However, a substantial portion of U.S. reserves are o¤ shore or in other environmentally protected areas, and the development of shale gas is currently politically contentious, making those reserves inaccessible in the near future. Further, the U.S. is cut o¤ by oceans from the other major users of natural gas, and hence must enter the world LNG market to fully exploit its reserves. 25 When it does, this will be a signi…cant driver of a true world LNG market. While it may to take a decade or more for such a uni…ed LNG market to develop, its development is apt to have a depressing e¤ect on natural gas prices through local spot markets, particularly in Europe, limiting the opportunities for market expansion and the earning ability of the Eurasian natural gas suppliers.
National Strategies
The energy situation in the world economy, coupled with growing environmental/climate concerns about energy use, thus presents both opportunities and threats to Eurasian countries of the FSU. Developments in technology have made natural gas both increasingly plentiful and increasingly necessary to meet environmental goals as 'alternative energy'sources remain inadequate, high cost, and problematic in their environmental side e¤ects. Hence there is an opportunity for these countries to pro…tably exploit their abundant reserves, and for Russia to exploit its strong market position in the richest market, Europe, in pursuit of modernizing development.
As we have noted, however, for most of these countries geography poses a substantial obstacle, and for all these countries the characteristics of gas transportation, the economics of pipelines, create risks and complicate relations between providers and users of natural gas. The lack of a competitive market environment for natural gas, and the lack of quickly accessible alternatives on all sides of pipeline relations, create lock-in, a strong dependence particularly on the part of those receiving and using the natural gas.
This opens the door to leverage, to opportunities for "opportunistic behavior" through hold-up, by parties to the relationship -the physical supply and income risks discussed above. This leverage can be used for both economic (monopolistic/monopsonistic exploitation) and political (in ‡uence/change international behavior or domestic policy) ends, and represents a potential threat to both economic well being and national sovereignty.
Thus each of the countries involved with gas energy -as producers, users, and transit providersnaturally develops strategies to deal with this situation, to exploit the opportunities and mitigate the hazards related to their participation in the natural gas energy chain. The structure of the problem leads to 3 sets of strategies, one for each role in the chain, with each country pursuing a mix of strategies depending on its various roles. Here we will brie ‡y discuss the response of the countries in Eurasia to this situation, the strategies that they -suppliers, users, and transit providers -appear to be following in pursuit of natural gas energy and income security. We now look at each of the Eurasian players, starting with the hegemon of Eurasian natural gas supply, the Russian Federation.
Russia
Russia, because of its location and natural endowment, has been both the largest net supplier and the major transit provider for almost all exported natural gas produced in the FSU. Russia operates through the state-controlled …rm, Gazprom, which holds a legal monopoly over all gas transportation outside local transportation networks. 26 As noted above, it holds a dominant market position in supply to Europe, and a near monopoly in gas supply to the eastern European states. 27 Until 2009, Russia was also a monopsonist with regard to central Asian gas export, controlling the only export pipelines out of the region going to Europe (see Fig. 4 ). Aside from small amounts piped south to Iran and Turkey, Russia was the sole international purchaser of central Asian natural gas. Russia used this cheap (monopsonistically priced) natural gas both for its own consumption and for supply of western FSU net consumers who, until recently, paid a substantially lower price than Europe. 28 This import allowed Russia to export more of its own gas to Europe where it could receive a higher (netback) price. This advantageous position has allowed Russia to generate substantial, relatively stable revenue that plays a critical role in Russia's national budget and economy. 29 Thus Russian strategies have focussed on maintaining that position, countering the e¤orts of other Eurasian producing, transit, and consuming states, to develop their own independent access to world/European markets and thereby compete with Russia for those revenues.
Russian strategies in this realm appear to be driven by two primary objectives: (1) Enhance Russian autonomy of behavior, both internationally and domestically, through exercise of in ‡uence over energy supplies, thereby restoring Russian in ‡uence in the world, and particularly in Eurasia, her "near abroad;"
(2) Maintain energy revenues critical to the support of the State Budget, state initiatives and development policies, and social/political stability. The revenues and leverage that Russia's unique position in the supply to Europe of Eurasian natural gas provide are critical components of each. Natural gas pipelines are most signi…cant for the …rst objective, as most Russian energy revenues derive from oil exports. And the price of oil is a world market phenomenon, not subject to control by Russian state policy, although both oil and gas prices are linked through natural gas price contracts. The lesser importance of gas for state revenues, however, means that it is more useful as a 'lever', since reducing volumes has less signi…cance for the state budget. 30 The pursuit of both objectives relies on the maintenance of state monopoly control over the export of energy, implemented through Gazprom. This allows maintenance of a uni…ed state position on the terms of energy contracts, one embedded in long-term national agreements. The Russian strategy is to maintain long-term netback pricing contracts, with take-or-pay provisions in the contracts, resisting any consideration of spot market gas prices by arguing that they only bene…t middleman traders while increasing disruptive volatility (Gazprom, 2012) . This strategy also involves building, through equity acquisition and operating agreements, down-stream positions controlling as many end-user distribution pipelines as possible, directly selling to …nal users, thereby securing income ‡ow and in ‡uence on both sides of contract negotiations.
This strategic objective has faced substantial opposition in Europe, and has met with limited success to date. 31 Indeed, on 4 September 2012, The European Commission announced launching a major anti-trust 2 6 A sole exception may be Novatek, a Swiss-registered independent gas trader, which recently signed a contract for export delivery to the German utility, EnBW. It is not clear where this gas is coming from or whether Gazprom will give access to it's pipeline to implement the contract. See Vedomosti, 16 July 2012, and WSJ, 6 September 2012. 2 7 In 2011, Russia provided 100% of Finish and Baltic gas consumption,over 98% of Bulgarian and Slovakian, 72% of Czech, 65% of Hungarian, about 63% of Polish and Austrian, 56% of Slovenian, and 53% of Greek consumption. It provided nearly 40% of German consumption, and over 26% of EU consumption (CRS, 2012). 2 8 Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine received natural gas at prices near the Russian domestic level through the 1990s and Putin's …rst presidential term. Since 2004 Russia has pressed to raise gas prices these FSU states pay to European market levels, and by now has substantially succeeded, as can be seen in Fig. 4 . 3 0 This is particularly true as the commercial, albeit state controlled, …rm, Gazprom, can absorb ‡uctuations in revenue in ways that the still more decentralized oil industry cannot. As discussed below, this can result in tension between Gazprom and the government as they pursue somewhat di¤ering objectives. 3 Fig. 9 below. When these by-passes are completed, they will undercut the 'hold up potential'of the western transit states, eliminating their leverage in price negotiations by insuring that they cannot disrupt deliveries to high paying European customers. They also, by delivering to di¤erent points in Europe, allow di¤erentiation among consumers, targeted supply with special terms for political purposes. And …nally, they will allow Russia to selectively 'punish'transit states, without jeopardizing her ability to meet contractual obligations to European customers. The northern route, Nord Stream, a joint
Russian-German-Dutch-French venture, has now been in operation for over a year, while the southern route, joint with Italy's ENI, has yet to begin construction. 36 The strategic construction of redundant delivery capacity has been costly in terms of diverted energy production investments, and has raised the question of whether Russia will have the output to eventually …ll these pipelines to meet growing European demand. Hence Russian natural gas strategies include plans to greatly expand the development of reserves and the capability to supply new natural gas. 37 The major gas basins intended for further development are illustrated in Fig. 10 . Of particular importance for new gas are the Shtokman …elds in the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea basin to be accessed from the north shore of Western Siberia including the Bonavanenko …elds of the Yamal Peninsula (See Fig. 11 and 12 38 Despite Gazprom's bravado in making the announcement, saying available gas supplies were su¢ cient, this raises a serious question about Gazprom's ability to meet its future supply commitments.
Russian strategy has also long included securing other FSU producers'natural gas to support its supply to Europe, using control over all the export pipelines out of the region. It was able to exploit its monopsony position to pay extraordinarily low prices ($80-90/1000 m 3 ) for this gas until 2009, when new export pipelines out of the region opened to China, and Turkmenistan was able to demand a higher price. Despite the development of those …elds to give Russia a say in how the gas is sold. 39 These enhanced pipelines would create relatively low cost export routes for central Asian natural gas, undercutting the economic rationale for their developing new export pipelines, and preserving Russia's market power over natural gas exports to
Europe. This strategy is coupled with that of working to block other export routes to the west, in particular the proposed trans-Caspian pipeline to Azerbaijan feeding any "southern route"through Georgia and Turkey to Europe. 40 In addition to the new and enhanced pipelines securing central Asian gas, Russia is strategically committed to developing new pipelines to east Asia, exploiting its potential development of East Siberian reserves
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11:pdf and providing alternatives to others' new pipelines to the region. These include an East Siberian-Paci…c Gas Pipeline (paralleling the ESPO oil line), the Altai Gas Pipeline proposal to western China, a SakhalinKhabarovsk-Vladivostok potentially extending to China, and a recently discussed Korean pipeline (Shin, 2011) , serving North Korea as a transit state while supplying the high-price South Korean market. South Korea currently pays among the highest prices, $715 per metric ton ($13.75/1000 ft 3 or $486/1000 m 3 ), for imported LNG, its only natural gas source, and hence can be an extremely lucrative market if North Korea cooperates. These largely potential pipelines are displayed in Fig. 13 .
An important component of the Russian strategy is the systematic building of excess pipeline capacity for export in all directions, with promises to deliver more than they can expect to produce. For example, 160 bcm/year has been promised to the EU by 2015, and up to 80 bcm/year to China by 2040 which will require development of both Shtokman and east Siberian gas …elds, and supporting pipelines, to meet both commitments simultaneously. Thus Nord Stream will add, when completed, 55 bcm delivery capacity 41 and South stream, when fully built, 63 bcm capacity to Europe, for which there are no supplies of natural gas without diversion from the Ukraine and Belarus pipelines. New pipelines from Western Siberian …elds are under construction, and a new Murmansk-Volkhov pipeline is planned for Shtokman gas, but there is no indication that there will be enough gas produced to …ll these, particularly given the "freezing" of the development of Shtokman, or indeed enough e¤ective demand at the end to justify its production. Still, this development makes strategic sense for Russia, as it mitigates demand risk, reducing the monopsony power of large consumers at the end of supply pipelines.
Finally, the Russian strategy aims to leverage its strong position in natural gas supply to reinforce its autonomy with respect to both domestic policy and its international behavior. 42 Russia insists in international negotiations on agreements respecting sovereign rights over energy decisions of each nation/state, and on block agreements imposing foreign norms on Russian behavior/decisions. Thus Russia has refused to ratify the EU Energy Charter, despite being an initial signatory. 43 Russia appears to systematically, demonstratively, but carefully exercise 'hold-up'power to in ‡uence others'policies. Thus the Baltic states, Belarus', Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia have faced cuto¤s of energy supplies as Russia tries to make a point about their domestic policies or international stance, as well as gas pricing and pipeline control. 44 gives it the con…dence to do so. (Saivetz, 2007) .
Russia vs. Gazprom?
Russian strategies with respect to natural gas potential and exports are implemented largely through the state controlled, ostensibly commercial, corporation, Gazprom. While from a distance they can appear to be fully united in the pursuit of Russian state interests, tensions occasionally surface between management of the commercial enterprise and the objectives of the state. Russia wants: (1) political leverage; (2) income for state; and (3) support of domestic industry and living standards; Gazprom wants its own empire and pro…tability. The primary issue is thus the extent to which Gazprom is able to pursue commercial interests separate from the interests of the Russian state. In part, the tensions arise due to Gazprom's dual roles of monopoly exporter of Russian and much of Eurasian natural gas, and of dominant domestic supplier of natural gas to Russian households, commercial, and governmental organizations. Gazprom currently has a 75% share of Russian natural gas production, a near monopoly over distribution to end user networks through its (Soviet inherited) uni…ed gas supply system (UGSS), and a monopoly on exports from and through Russia.
In the latter role, there is little room for tension; maintaining market power with respect an essential product to its users is both pro…table and in ‡uence enhancing. There might be disagreement over tactics -degree of pricing ‡exibility and room for renegotiation in long term contracts -but there is ultimate agreement over the thrust of strategy. That strategy is to maintain production, market share, and a (near) monopoly position in European markets, using by-pass pipelines -a 'pincer movement' -to avoid transit disruptions, while maintaining long-term …x-price contracts. 47 Gazprom is attempting, with Russian government help, to negotiate more stable long term prices with EU, and indeed has recently succeeded in doing so. 48 Gazprom is looking to replace Libya in supplying natural gas to Italy, through South Stream and the BTGI Interconnector pipelines, which will also undercut any European by-pass (e.g. NABUCCO)
to Central Asian natural gas, and is also looking to supply new LNG to Japan after Fukushima. All this is integral to the Russian state strategies discussed above. One divergence, however, is in the development of new far eastern pipelines, a strategic interest of the state. Thus there is little chance of East Siberian Gas
Pipeline (Kovytka-Altai-West China) unless forced by Russian state; it, like the Shtokman reserves, appears to Gazprom too costly to commercially justify.
There is more room for disagreement about domestic policies. Here Gazprom's pro…t motive con ‡icts with the Russian state's need to provide 'rents'to key constituencies, political, economic and social (Gaddy, Ickes, 2005). The state has a primary interest in maintaining domestic tranquility and control, and so is willing to sacri…ce (Gazprom's) pro…ts, and delay structural reforms it recognizes as necessary, to avoid social and political unrest. The maintenance of relatively low domestic prices and the redistribution of net export earnings are both critical to achieving this objective. Hence increases in domestic gas prices are limited, and some competition in domestic supply is encouraged, in particular by opening access to Gazprom's domestic pipelines in a new "Law on Associated Gas and Access to UGSS." 49 Gazprom, however, wants equalized export and domestic prices, and until then invests most to maintain export potential ahead of developing new gas. Indeed, for much desired commercial development, Gazprom needs capital the Russian State won't allow it to retain from earnings, or give to it. Thus the main divergence between Russian state and Gazprom interests lies in the subsidization of domestic Russian consumption, by both households and producers, of natural gas and the reallocation of Gazprom's export earnings to higher state priorities. In addition, growth in Gazprom's capitalization and pro…tability requires greater contractual ‡exibility and commercial risk sharing through equity swaps than Russian state policy currently allows.
Central Asia and Azerbaijan
The other Eurasian net suppliers, as economically underdeveloped, energy-resource rich, and only recently sovereign states, have a common primary objective of maintaining that sovereignty. Their strategies revolve around exploiting those resources to maximize national income and autonomy. However, they were all initially constrained by the legacy of the Soviet Union -a uni…ed Soviet pipeline system channeling all output, beyond local consumption, to and through Russia (Fig. 3 above) . And they are all inherently limited in the pursuit of this objective by geography -their location is far from rich consumers, across di¢ cult terrain. This leaves them susceptible to Russian monopsony exploitation, which indeed was practiced for over a decade after the demise of the Soviet Union. 4 7 In 2009, Gazprom sacri…ced European market share to spot markets in order to maintain the net-back pricing principle. Gazprom (2012) . 4 8 At present, Gazprom's portfolio of signed long-term contracts (apart from prospective volumes through the South Stream gas pipeline) obliges the Company to distribute at least 3.1 trillion cubic meters of gas beyond the FSU during the contracts validity period (up to 25 years), which is equivalent to the export revenue of USD 1 trillion (at current prices). Recent long-term contracts include German, French and Italian energy companies and utilities, under intergovernmental agreements, and most east European and Balkan countries. See <http://www.gazprom.com/about/marketing/europe/> 4 9 See discussion in Simon Pirani, "Liberalisation Heralds Change in the Gas Market," Russian Analytic Digest, No. 100, 26 July 2011, p. 10-13.
Thus the strategy of each of these states is built on pushing away from the inherited Russian grip on their natural gas resources and policy, breaking dependence on Russian demand. That involves limiting dependence on Gazprom, bringing in Western majors as development partners, but maintaining full national sovereignty over resources on their own territory. To maintain and further enhance revenue from natural gas sales, these states initially tried to negotiate higher sales prices to Russia, generally unsuccessfully until 14 December 2009, when the Russian monopsony was broken. 50 That was a consequence of having pursued a strategy of trying to develop new outlets to other consumers than Russia, in particular China, leading Russia/Gazprom, as discussed above, to o¤er a higher price.
There also have been long and inconclusive negotiations with Europe, and each other, on developing a trans-Caspian "southern route" across Turkey (NABUCCO and its competitors -see below) to bring potential Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh natural gas to high-paying European customers. But that remains an unful…lled promise, despite limited volumes of Azeri gas being delivered to Turkish pipelines through the BZE pipeline. Rather, China has entered as an active Russia/Gazprom counterweight. The breakthrough came with the Chinese …nanced 1822 km Trans-Asia Pipeline through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China, which is managed by a new "Trans Asia Gas Pipeline Company, Ltd.,"owned 50-50 by China and the nation in which it is located (Fig. 7) . Kazakhstan and China have also completed a Kazakhstan-China pipeline. 51 And China is proposing diversifying routes out of Turkmenistan, mitigating any transit hazards it may face, by building a new 30 bcm/year pipeline through northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan. In addition to insuring China, this route-diversi…cation will provide Tajikistan an alternative to total dependence on Uzbek natural gas supply and transit.
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Another common strategy has been to begin developing new natural gas deposits, enhancing energy sales potential. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have actively involved western companies, as well as Gazprom, attracting foreign investment without sacri…cing control, and after the death of the Turkmenbashi, Nayazev, even Turkmenistan has allowed western estimates and audits of it natural gas potential. 53 And Turkmenistan has recently allow China not only to …nance, build, and own pipelines on its territory, but has also allowed CNPC to enter a production sharing agreement for development of a new …eld (Bagtyarlyk). 54 One consequence has been the vast expansion of known usable natural gas reserves noted (Section 2.1.1) above, and hence strong incentives for foreign investors and energy majors to support its access to world markets.
Without such access, the strategy of expanding gas production is of limited value. Europe, South Asia, and North-East Asia present a substantially higher paying demand than China, but new pipelines across vast distances are needed to access it. While China can potentially absorb all gas sent eastward out of central Eurasia, South Asia (India, Pakistan) presents a pipeline opportunity across Afghanistan. Iran, containing the shortest route from Turkmenistan to the sea and hence to pipelines east and west, once its political issues with the West are resolved, is also a potential valuable route. Thus there have long been discussions with western majors and the relevant countries about TAPI pipelines to the south (Fig. 7) fed by the Turkmen Dauletabad …eld. 55 This would supply two economies with rapidly growing demand for natural gas, Pakistan The European Commission has long focussed on developing access the Eurasian natural gas that avoids dependence on Russia, as a matter of energy security. In October 2002, with EU encouragement, an Austrian (OMV Gas & Power) led consortium, NABUCCO, 58 was formed to develop a "southern by-pass" of the Russian pipeline system, insuring against potential cut-o¤, whether for economic or political reasons. The project has stumbled along for a decade without real progress toward developing an adequate pipeline, 59 while Russia has substantially expanded its capability to deliver natural gas to Europe, bypassing the transit states. That, together with proposed enhancement of its central Asian pipelines (Centre and Prikaspiisky),
gives Russia a greater lock on the delivery of Eurasian natural gas to the west, depriving central Asia and
Azerbaijan of signi…cant independent access to high paying Western users.
Azerbaijan has found this situation unacceptable as its 'Shah-Deniz 1'…eld reaches capacity, and 'Shah- 5 6 There have been discussions, and some preliminary agreements, about an Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI, aka "peace," pipeline), and looser discussions of a subsea Indian Ocean pipeline, both fed from the South Pars …eld in the Persian Gulf, split between Qatar and Iran. See Verma (2007) . 5 7 V. Socor, "Timely Development Essential for Bringing Turkmen Gas to Europe," EDM, 8(218), 1 December 2011. 5 8 For a brief history of NABUCCO see <http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/ >. 5 9 See "Con…dence in the Nabucco Project Fading," EDM, 9(21), 31 January 2012.
Deniz 2' readies for production. It anticipates producing 50-55 bcm per year by 2025, most of which is destined for export (EDM, 9(38), 23 February 2012). Thus it is taking the initiative (and risks) in developing a new export route, without speci…cally contracted demand, based on the success of the BTC oil and BZE (South Caucasus Pipeline to the Turkish border) gas pipelines. In 2011-12, Azerbaijan signed a series of agreements with Turkey to build a new Trans-Anatolia (TANAP, aka BOTAS) pipeline for which it would take primary …nancing responsibility and ownership (80%). It will begin operating in 2018, when ShahDeniz 2 will begin producing. 60 This pipeline would run from the Georgian border to the European border, rendering most of NABUCCO irrelevant and reducing it to an extension of the TANAP pipeline (Nabucco West, from May 2012). 61 In support of TANAP, the South Caucasus Pipeline is being expanded from 8 to 23 bcm capacity by 2017, while TANAP will increase its capacity to 24 bcm in 2023, to 31 bcm in 2026, and ultimately to 60 bcm if Turkmen gas becomes fully available. 62 It provides a direct strategic challenge to Russia's South Stream Ukrainian by-pass pipeline, despite its initial small scale, by depriving Russia of the prospect of supplying Caspian natural gas through that pipeline. The TANAP pipeline will thus guarantee Azerbaijan access to external customers independent of Russian energy policy. 63 It has also altered Europe's understanding and approach to its Southern Corridor gas supply diversi…cation project, with the European Commission in early 2012 incorporating TANAP into its southern corridor planning (EDM, 9(108), 7 June 2012) and other European pipeline projects adjusting to its reality (EDM, 9(148), 3 August 2012).
These strategic developments have begun to level the playing …eld with Russia. Chinese competition, and the Azeri initiatives, have forced Russia to economically compete for central Asian natural gas, substantially raising the prices it o¤ers, and perhaps stimulating future Russian provision of direct access, through Gazprom pipelines, to Europe and beyond. And continuing Russian interest in central Asian gas gives these producers the ability to bargain for better terms from China, once the initial (25 year, with extensions) contracts, paying o¤ Chinese investments, come to an end. This improved situation will only be further enhanced if/when additional outlets to the south and west become available.
Eurasian Transit States
The Eurasian transit states, with the exception of Russia, have a similar strategic energy focus to that of nonRussian Eurasian producers -to maintain and enhance sovereignty, and to stimulate economic growth and development. Russia, as argued above, uses its unique transit position in the supply of Europe to enhance its market power and leverage over the FSU states. It is working to maintain this position through active
Gazprom participation in infrastructure, both production and transportation, development in the central Asian gas producers, including enhancing the Asian Centre pipeline and signing preliminary agreements on developing the new Prikaspiisky pipeline. 64 While it was unable to forestall Chinese infrastructure investment in export pipelines to China, Russia has begun actively competing on price to attract natural gas supplies through its pipelines, taking advantage of the fact that Europe pays a far higher price than China. And as we have seen, Russia actively opposes development of the trans-Caspian pipeline that would give central 6 0 It will initially upgrade and use existing Turkish pipes, but later develop second and third parallel lines. 6 bcm/year is intended for Turkish consumption and the rest for export to Europe. See S. Kardas, "Turkey Reiterates Committment to South Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline," EDM, 9(1), 3 January 2012, and V. Socor, "Direct Road to Europe: Azerbaijan's Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline," EDM, 9(2), 4 January 2012.
6 1 See V. Socor, "Post-Nabucco Era in Caspian Pipeline Business and Politics," EDM, 9(24) 3 February 2012, and "Nabucco West Selected for Caspian Gas Delivery to Central Europe," EDM, 9(124), 29 June 2012.. 6 2 V. Socor, "Aliyev, Ergodan Sign Inter-Governmental Agreement on Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline to Europe, EDM, 9(122), 27 June 2012. 6 3 Of course, a Russian invasion of Georgia could cut Azeri access to this pipeline, forcing gas back through Russian pipelines. Asian producers alternative access to Europe.
The other central Asian states serve as both end users and transit routes for Uzbek and Turkmen natural gas, as it moves to Russia or, since 2009, to China. All seek to enhance revenue through alternatives to Russian export routes, and all are actively engaging China in development of export routes. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, not currently transit states, have recently been seeking transit roles to partake in revenues from export to China, apparently with Chinese encouragement. They also seek greater energy security in diversifying from dependence on supply through Uzbekistan alone. Afghanistan, another potential transit state, has expressed interest in the various TAPI proposals and a Chinese proposed Turkmen-China pipeline that would provide it with energy as well as earn transit revenues. 65 Their interests and strategies are fully consonant with those, discussed above, of the central Asian producers.
The critical transit states in posing problems for the realization of Russia's strategic objectives, have been those to the west, between Russia and Europe. Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus all sit astride parts of the natural gas pipeline system the Soviet Union built for energy exports to Europe. This makes them both overwhelmingly dependent on Russia for natural gas energy, and critical components of Russia's ability to sell to the European market. Moldova, the poorest country in Europe with limited transit capacity, has sought accommodation, surrendering control of its pipelines for fading price guarantees. 66 Belarus, despite much rhetorical bluster to the contrary, has abandoned resistance to Russian encroachment, turning over its energy infrastructure, and seeking salvation through an economic union with Russia. 67 It hopes to maintain transit relevance, despite being rendered unnecessary for gas supply to western Europe by the Nord Stream by-pass pipelines, by being 'lower cost'and 'more secure'for Russia than the alternatives (Nord Stream and Ukraine, respectively). And Belarus remains a critical conduit for sale of Russian oil to western Europe through major pipelines now again under Russian control. In return, Belarus has secured continuing subsidization of its natural gas consumption, and numerous other direct and indirect subsidies for its unreformed economy.
The most important transit state, with some 80% of pipeline capacity to Europe, is Ukraine, which is also a substantial consumer of Russian supplied natural gas (37. The Ukrainian strategy of attempting to use transit leverage to negotiate long term lower natural gas prices has failed, although Ukraine retains ownership of its own gas transportation infrastructure. 69 That 6 5 EDM, 9(116), June 19, 2012, and Foster (2010) . 6 6 Here, as in Georgia, Russia has protected a break-away province, Trans-Dnestria, blocking OSCE activity on the issue, and pressuring Moldova to accept this division of its sovereignty. 6 7 "Gas Deal with Belarus Gives Control of Pipeline to Russia,"NYT, 25 November 2011, <www.naturalgaseurope.com/russiabelarus-gas-discounts>, 17 August 2011, on price discounts o¤ered by Russia, and the Belarussian BelaPAN report on resulting enhanced transit revenues, <http://udf.by/english/economy/61067>. 6 8 Gazprom has explicitly stated that the "fate of South Stream depends on Ukraine" -if Ukraine gives its natural gas infrastructure into Russian control, then there is no need for the costly "by-pass" route. See Vedomosti, 27 December 2011. 6 9 Also see the discussion of negotiations over purchase and transit prices, which Ukraine hopes to raise, in EDM, 8(86), 4 infrastructure is now, however, quite old and increasingly prone to breakdown. Gazprom has argued that it should have some ownership and su¢ cient control to maintain that infrastructure, as the pipelines are largely used to support its sales to Europe. Unwilling to give up control, Ukraine has made inviting the European Union into management/maintenance of its pipelines as part of its strategy, proposing a Consortium that would leave Gazprom with a minority share. 70 This would undercut the rationale for the Russian/Gazprom pipeline 'pincer movement'by bringing the EU to the Russian border with lower costs for transit, without surrendering control over the transportation system to Russia/Gazprom. A …nal critical component of the Ukrainian strategy is reduction of dependence on Russian natural gas. Ukraine is refusing to recognize "take or pay"clauses in its purchase contracts, arguing that E.On, ENI, and other European buyers have been able to negotiate around them, and has cut back substantially on purchases in 2012. 71 The Ukrainian national energy strategy also envisions developing its own natural gas production, including shale gas, and building facilities for LNG import. 72 In particular, Ukraine has been seeking to join the "shale revolution," inviting western 'majors', Shell and Chevron, to extract shale gas (EDM, 9 (97) There is one further strategically signi…cant pair of transit states for Eurasian natural gas, Georgia and
Turkey. Both must import most of their own consumption of gas, and each is critical for Caspian natural gas.
As states sitting on the only transit route substantially free of Russia, they have been central to European (5) Bursa-Komotini (Turkey-Greece), part of TGI supply to south Europe (11.9 bcm). Thus Turkey is a signi…cant transit player for all sides, Europe, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. By diversifying both its natural gas suppliers and sales outlets, Turkey is insuring itself against any 'hold-up'while guaranteeing a steady ‡ow of transit revenues and substantial political in ‡uence with its neighbors. With TANAP, Turkey is stepping into a role that the EU and NABUCCO never got around to fully o¤ering it. Turkey is now the critical connector and supplier to a shrunk "Nabucco West,"stretching only from her border to the Austrian hub, and a direct competitor to Russia's South Stream, which is also just getting o¤ the ground (EDM, 9(148), 3 August 2012). But TANAP has an advantage in that competition, as its prime mover, Azerbaijan, has direct access to the Caspian region gas that Russia was hoping would …ll South Stream.
Consumers'Strategies
The economic environment in which producer and transit state strategies play out is signi…cantly molded by the policy decisions and actions -the strategies, implicit or explicit -of the major users of Eurasian natural gas. It is their e¤ective demand, and approaches to satisfying it, that provides the current and expected future payo¤s to any actions undertaken by producers and or transit suppliers of energy. Thus they have been discussed above in clarifying the strategies pursued by natural gas producing and transit states. Here we close those arguments by summarizing the main thrust of the energy policies of the consuming states as those policies relate to the development and use of Eurasian natural gas.
There are four major consuming regions around and adjacent to the periphery of the Eurasian natural gas suppliers, and hence potential gas pipeline customers. The traditional and still overwhelmingly largest consumer of Eurasian natural gas is Europe to the west, with the remaining centers of, still largely potential, demand in Asia to the south and east. All are, in principle, accessible by pipeline, but almost all existing pipelines move gas to the west, to Europe. As we have seen, most producer strategies, and some transit strategies, are aimed at diversifying this ‡ow, generating new outlets for this invaluable product, although some are working to enhance the ‡ow toward Europe.
As the primary consumer of Eurasian natural gas, the European Union (EU) has been seeking a uni…ed voice in dealing with the primary supplier, Russia. and 2009, stimulating e¤orts in three strategic directions: diversi…cation of supply, internal gas network restructuring, and a 'de-monopolization'drive to insure competitive conditions in gas supply. Each of these undercuts the capability, and/or mitigates the impact, of any e¤ort by Russia to exercise market power or achieve political leverage through the threat of supply reduction of this essential commodity.
Diversi…cation of supply has included the support of a "souther corridor," route avoiding dependence on Russia for Eurasian natural gas, fed by a trans-Caspian pipeline opening central Asian gas directly to Europe, 78 and encouraging the development of LNG capabilities. This was to be based on NABUCCO, which however received little other than verbal backing, and only inconsistent political support. And it faced the risk that Russian Blue Stream and South Stream (Black Sea) gas pipelines would preempt southern route pipeline capacities, rendering it uneconomical, particularly given the lack of European initiative and real support for developing the trans-Caspian pipeline to insure adequate supply to this southern route. Only in the past year has the European southern by-pass of Russia been given new life, through the Azerbaijani entrepreneurship and capital, as a shorter continuation pipeline from TANAP. 79 The second strategic direction is complementary to the …rst. It involves building reversible pipeline interconnections, and expanding storage capacity, to allow gas shortages, for whatever reason, in vulnerable parts of the European Union to be countered by redirecting supplies from other areas and sources. 80 This would render the eastern European countries far less vulnerable to stoppages of gas ‡ow (hold-up) from the east, by allowing redirection from other sources, including imported LNG.
Finally, and most objectionable from the Russian/Gazprom perspective, is the de-monopolization (EU Energy Charter and Transit Protocol) strategy. Among other provisions, EU law implementing the charter treaty will force separation of ownership of production and transportation, which would force Gazprom out of the pipeline business within Europe, the opposite of one of its primary strategic objectives (see above). 81 It also forces pipeline owners to grant automatic third-party access to their pipelines on non-discriminatory terms, which would loosen Gazprom's grip over non-Russian Eurasian, and independent Russian producer's (e.g. Novatek ), gas passing through its pipelines to Europe, e¤ectively eliminating any pipeline access monopsony power. And it regulates the kind of gas contracts that can be signed, directly attacking seller's market power and again running directly counter to Gazprom's marketing strategy (see above).
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The second most signi…cant consumer of Eurasian natural gas is China. China, in the pursuit of energy for economic development as well as regional and international in ‡uence, has been active world wide in e¤orts to secure access to, and where possible, control over, a broad range of energy supplies. This has included active participation in exploration, development, and processing of energy resources in virtually every continent except Europe. 83 In Central Asia, as we have seen, it has been an active driver and facilitator of the strategies of both producers and transit states, as it pursues its strategic objectives of securing new energy resources through investment in new development initiatives in energy …elds (Turkmenistan) and investment in new international pipelines (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzia). China has also been actively negotiating with Russia for over a decade about terms of supply of natural gas, where it seeks a commitment of 40-80 bcm/year at a price substantially below both European netback and Asian LNG prices. 84 While
China has been able to come to agreement with Russia on oil supply, and indeed provide some investment toward that end, 85 the absence of a world market for natural gas is allowing it to exercise some monopsony power before it is tied into Russian pipeline gas supply. Indeed, with its rapidly expanding access to relatively low cost Turkmen gas (see above), and its active development of LNG capability and other energy resources across the world, China is in a strong market position with respect to natural gas, despite its rapidly rising demand. This strategy of diversi…cation of supply is moving toward insuring China against supply risk, while providing it the ability to play existing and potential suppliers against each other, thereby lowering the costs of development of the Chinese economy and Chinese national power.
The remaining ring of demand for Eurasian natural gas is currently more potential than actual. It encompasses two parts in very di¤erent strategic positions: northeast Asia (Japan and Korea) and South Asia (India and Pakistan). The former are economically developed and willing to pay a high price -they are now importing extremely expensive LNG, as seen above. 40% of South Korean and 25% of Japanese LNG imports come from the middle east, and most of the rest from the Asian-Paci…c region. Russia in 2011
supplied under 8% and 9%, respectively, of Korean and Japanese LNG imports. Both Korea and Japan have a strategic interest in increasing Eurasian LNG supply, and in accessing Russian pipeline gas from Sakhalin, and perhaps East Siberia, should it be developed to supply China. South Korea also hopes that a Russian pipeline through the North, will ease tensions and help unite the Koreas (Shin, 2011 In the wake of the Fukushima tsunami disaster, Japan has faced the domestic political necessity of moving away from nuclear power, a primary domestic energy source (30% of its electricity in 2010; IEA, 2011b)).
Thus Japan has actively engaged Russia, reaching agreement at the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok to build a $13 billion, 10 million ton/year LNG terminal for supply of Japan to be completed in 2018.
86
This will provide about 12 % of Japan's current LNG imports. In addition, discussions were begun on the potential development of an 800 km undersea pipeline from Vladivostok to Niigata on the Japanese coast, which should substantially reduce energy costs in Japan. Japan's strategy, however, also includes further diversi…cation of LNG supply, as it looks to the potential development of North American exports from an abundance of shale gas. Such exports, should they be politically allowed to develop, could dramatically lower LNG costs in Asia, spurring a true world market, and reducing the value of pipeline connections to Eurasia/Russia. Once, however, pipelines are put in place, they could remain competitive due to the low unit (marginal) cost of supplying gas through existing infrastructure.
South Asia remains much less of a strategic player, despite its rapidly growing need for natural gas.
Despite vast population and development needs, neither India nor Pakistan have su¢ cient infrastructure for large scale import of natural gas. Pakistan currently consumes all it produces (39.2 bcm), importing no gas, while India consumes 50% more than it produces (41.5 bcm), importing the rest as high priced LNG, largely from MENA. Both underconsume substantially per capita, and want to increase consumption. Thus both have expressed interest in pipeline gas from Central Asia, and indeed from the middle east. There are 3 major pipelines that have been discussed, with some preliminary, exploratory agreements signed: TAPI 8 4 On the 7 years of so far inconclusive price negotiations between Russia and China, see S. Blagov, "Russian Gas Export Plans Face Reality check," EDM, 9(37), 22 February 2012. 8 5 On 17 February 2009, a $25 billion 'loan for oil'deal was signed between Rosneft and CNPC, inmvesting in the development of Russian oil export infrastructure. 8 6 Mirsuru Obe, "Thirst for Energy Shapes Japan's Ties," WSJ, 5 September 2012.
from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan; IPI from Iran; an undersea trans-Indian Ocean pipeline from Qatar. 87 India and Pakistan, however, are in no position …nancially to take an active role in developing such pipelines. And each of these pipelines faces enormous political and technical obstacles. TAPI must overcome the political instability and unrest in war-torn Afghanistan and the Northwestern Territories of Pakistan, IPI faces political unrest (low grade insurrection) in Baluchistan (western Pakistan), and both must overcome the distrust, indeed enmity, between India and Pakistan. 88 And the undersea pipeline from Qatar's South Pars …eld would face huge technical complications as the longest and most expensive undersea pipeline yet, despite avoiding most political complications. TAPI also faces technical di¢ culties due to the extreme terrain through which it must pass. Thus the primary strategy of these countries, recognizing their growing need for natural gas, is to develop internal infrastructure and present that growing demand as an opportunity to producers and suppliers of natural gas, including those in Eurasia. In pursuit of this strategy they are actively developing LNG import capacity to take advantage of Australian, Indonesian, MENA, and potentially cheap North American LNG.
Summary and Conclusion
The Eurasian FSU states sit astride vast natural wealth, an essential input into economic development and prosperity in the foreseeable future, in their reserves of natural gas. Because it provides transportable highenergy content with a relatively low environmental impact, natural gas provides an essential bridge fuel to any 'green', non-hydro carbon powered future over the next 50 or more years. That is particularly important to the developed states of Europe and east Asia, where a primary non-hydro carbon energy source, nuclear, is increasingly being rejected. But it is also critically important for providing relatively "clean power" for economic development in middle and lower income countries, reducing the environmental and climate impact of their inevitable growth. And it is in Eurasia where the greatest net supply of this resource is currently available.
This source of energy is also surrounded by the areas with the largest net demand for this energy, the Eurasian periphery of Europe, South Asia, and East Asia. However, as we have argued, their access to Eurasian natural gas is bedeviled by geographic, technological, economic, and geopolitical di¢ culties.
Geography forces access over long distances across di¢ cult terrain, which necessitates large-capacity pipelines to make that access economically feasible. The scale and location of these pipelines impact whole nations, not just the producing, transporting, and using companies. And they generate 'lock-in'among participants, and hence exploitable market power (opportunities for "opportunistic behavior"), creating risks for all involved.
All must act to insure against these problems, and/or mitigate their consequences. Hence state actors with national interests become involved, each pursuing those interests strategically within a framework forced by the locations of natural gas resources and their most valuable uses.
Russia, with its agent Gazprom, comprise the central player, in every sense, in this interaction. Russia is working to maintain its dominance as supplier to the world's most lucrative European gas markets by enhancing its ability to supply gas to Europe and warding o¤ (deterring) threats to its European markets from other sources, including EU regulations. The EU has taken a legalistic approach to defending its interests, but has done little, other than rhetorically, to encourage development of alternatives to Russian supply. The primary (potential) challenges to Russian gas supply dominance are currently coming from 8 7 For an analysis of TAPI and its competitors, especially IPI, see Foster (2010) . 8 8 Verma (2007) provides an excellent discussion of the issues around IPI.
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. In collaboration with China, Turkmenistan has undercut Russian ability to use central Asian gas to support supply to Europe. Azerbaijan is providing a more direct challenge.
Working with Turkey, it has taken the initiative to provide Europe with its "southern route,"bringing soon to be plentiful Caspian gas to Europe ahead of Russia's South Stream. And it has come to agreement with Turkmenistan on pushing forward toward sending trans-Caspian, primarily Turkmen, to Europe through that route. Turkey has also expressed support, as has the European Commission in 2011 (EDM, 9(137), 19
July, and 9(164), 11 September 2012). This will, however, require some Caspian littoral states agreement on the use of that sea, overcoming Russian and Iranian objections.
The biggest challenge to all these Eurasian producers is growing outside the region. It comes from the rapid development of new shale gas extraction and deep sea drilling technologies, and the falling costs of LNG supply. There is the prospect of both new, local shale gas supply, reducing demand for pipeline gas from far away, and a ‡exible LNG market able to satisfy demand at a moderate price anywhere accessible from the sea. Both of those prospects put substantial pressure on Eurasian producers to develop infrastructure rapidly, while gas prices are still high, so that they will remain competitive in the new market environment due to the low variable cost of gas supply through already built infrastructure.
What are the likely prospects here? Within a decade, due to Chinese initiatives, we can expect substantially more central Eurasian pipeline gas to be delivered to China, while Russia will focus largely on LNG to northeast Asia to its east. Similarly, the Azeri-Turkish initiatives should open new substantial supply to southern Europe, giving Europe greater leverage in negotiating with Gazprom. Russia/Gazprom will thus be forced to price more competitively, abandoning the oil products net-back principle, and perhaps even opening its pipelines to other producers, in order to remain competitive and economically justify the construction of the by-pass pipelines'extra capacity. Further, we can expect a relatively competitive world LNG market to develop, unifying gas prices around the lowest cost delivered in su¢ cient quantity in each market/region, driven by 'new technology' gas production. Having maintained pipeline infrastructure in place will allow the Eurasian natural gas producers to remain competitive in this new environment, but only if they take advantage of the next …ve to ten years to fully develop the requisite infrastructure in cooperation with the transit states.
